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STRATEGIC  ALLIANCES AND JOINT VENTURES
UNDER  NAFTA:  CONCEPTS  AND EVIDENCE
David Sparling and Roberta Cook
INTRODUCTION
Cooperative  business relationships are dramatically changing the structure of
the  North American  agri-food  sector.  An examination  of recent events  in the  grain
industry  reveals  the extent  to which cooperative  ventures  are becoming  integrated
into  international  agribusiness.  When  Cargill  decided  to  expand  its  presence  in
Canada it participated in several joint ventures, one with Hazzard Farm Services in a
grain  elevator  business,  another  with Agricore  in a  Vancouver  port  terminal  and
several  with retail level dealers.  Competitor  ADM entered into a joint venture with
United  Grain Growers  (UGG)  of Manitoba  purchasing  40  percent  of UGG.  ADM
provided  an  infusion  of  funds  and  secured  access  to  170  grain  elevators  in  the
Canadian prairie provinces in return. Among its myriad of other alliances, ADM has
an alliance with Grupo Maseca  (GRUMA)  of Mexico,  the market leader in wet corn
milling,  flour mills and soybean products, and it recently acquired  22 percent  of the
stock  in GRUMA.  Meanwhile,  Saskatchewan  Wheat Pool  (SWP) entered  into three
joint ventures:  a port facility in Manzanillo  with Comercializadora  La Junta  (CLJ)  of
Mexico;  a  grain  elevator  in Northgate,  North  Dakota  with  General  Mills;  and  a
terminal  in Gdansk,  Poland  with European  partners.  SWP was  also  involved in a
long  standing  relationship  with  Canadian  competitor,  Agricore,  to  market  grain
internationally  through a joint venture agency, XCAN.
The North American Free Trade Agreement  (NAFTA) has reduced or removed
many  of  the  impediments  to U.S./Canada/Mexico  trade.  However,  it  takes  more
than lower trade barriers  to capture the economic  benefits  from increased  agri-food
trade.  Firms  must  organize  sufficient  resources  to  identify  new  markets  and
opportunities  and  to  produce,  distribute  and  service  products  in  those  markets.
Entering  new  international  markets is  beyond the capabilities  of many  companies,
prompting  many  to  look  to  other  organizations  for  the  additional  resources  and
capabilities needed.
Although alliances between trading organizations date back to the time of the
Phoenicians, the number of new alliances has grown exponentially in the last decade.
In  the United  States,  alliance  formations  ranged  from  55-124  per  year  in  1970-82
(Ghemawat  et  al.,  1985)  to an  annual  average  of 391  during  the four  year period
1986-89  (Culpan,  1993).  In  the 1970s and  1980s,  domestic  joint ventures occurred
twice as often in the United States as international joint ventures  (Killing,  1983). By
1987,  U.S./foreign  alliances  had  overtaken  U.S./U.S.  alliances  (Culpan, 1993).  The
results  of the 1990s are dramatically  different.  Consultants at Booz,  Allen, Hamilton
estimate  that 32,000 strategic alliances have been created worldwide in the last three
years,  with three-quarters  of them international  alliances1. Alliances  account  for at
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least half of the market entries into Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe (Adarkar
et al., 1997). Strategic  alliances and joint ventures are the new international business
norm, not the exception.
Under  NAFTA,  economic  interaction  and  integration  between  Canadian,
Mexican and U.S. agribusiness firms has increased dramatically. Both agri-food trade
(Figure 1)  and  foreign  direct  investment  have  grown  substantially  (Handy  and
Bamford, 1999).














Source:  Agriculture  and  Agri-Food  Canada  Trade  and  USDA.
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Trade and investment figures tell only part of the story. They track the flow of
products and investments, but overlook the flow of knowledge and profits between
firms and nations.  These flows,  so essential to global competitiveness,  are facilitated
by  close corporate  interaction,  through  mergers  and  acquisitions  but  also through
co-operative relationships,  strategic alliances and joint ventures.
The  ability  to use  cooperative  inter-firm  relationships  will  be  an important
factor  in corporate  success.  This paper  examines  agri-food  strategic  alliances  and
joint  ventures,  beginning  with  a  discussion  of  alliance  types  and  definitions.  A
conceptual model, the strategic alliance life cycle, is presented.  The nature of NAFTA
related  agri-food  joint ventures  and strategic  alliances  is discussed.  An analysis  of
alliances  and joint ventures  involving the fresh produce industry in Sinaloa, Mexico
are examined at the industry level and at the level of an individual firm. A discussion
and conclusions follow.
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JOINT VENTURES  AND STRATEGIC  ALLIANCES -DEFINITIONS
Interactions  between organizations  can take many forms,  from market trans-
actions  to  relationships  so  close  that  it  is  difficult  to  distinguish  where  one
organization ends and the next begins. Lorange and Roos (1991) examined inter-firm
relationships  along  two  dimensions,  first,  as  a  continuum  ranging  from  vertical
integration,  or hierarchies,  at  one end to free  market  transactions  at the other  and
second, by the degree of interdependence  (Figure 2).
Figure  2: A Continuum of Cooperative  Arrangements
Mergers and  Joint  Joint  Formal  Informal
Acquisitions  Ownership  Venture  Cooperative  Cooperative
Venture  Venture
Vertical Integration  4  b  Market
Transactions
High  . Low
Interdependence  Interdependence
Source: Lorange  and Roos 1991.
Definitions  of  cooperative  relationships  vary.  Joint  ventures  carry  the
connotation  of  shared  ownership  (Badaracco,  1991).  Some  authors  define  a  joint
venture as a separate legal entity with ownership shared by both partners (Harrigan,
1984,  Geringer,  1991).  In  this  paper,  a  more  liberal  definition  is  employed.  Joint
ventures  (JVs) are defined as legal arrangements where ownership and management
of an  organization  are  shared by  more  than  one  organization.  This  appears  to be
consistent with the generally accepted  agri-food industry definition of JVs.  Many  of
the grain industry examples cited in the introduction are of this type and are defined
by both participants and popular press as joint ventures.
Strategic alliances  (SA) are defined more broadly, covering a variety of flexible
cooperative arrangements  between organizations,  from fluid, short term cooperation
to long term, formal  agreements  (Das & Teng,  1998; Murray  and Mahon, 1993).  In a
strategic alliance,  partners remain independent  after forming the alliance, both share
alliance  management  and  benefits,  and  both  contribute  to  the  alliance  on  a
continuing basis (Yashino and Rangan, 1995).
For  purposes  of  this  paper,  strategic  alliances  are  defined  as  cooperative
relationships between2 organizations that meet the following criteria:
Partners  share  resources,  capabilities  and/or  knowledge  on  a
continuing basis;
2  Most alliances occur between two organizations but there are many instances of relationships  among three or
more.  Note  that  in  this  paper  references  to  alliances  between  two  organizations  could  also  refer  to
relationships among more than two organizations.
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*  The alliances have strategic intent for the partners; and
*  Alliance  objectives  include  the  sharing  and/or  exchange  of
products, services,  knowledge and profits.
The  last criterion  encompasses  a multitude  of cooperative  activities ranging
from shared research and product development, closer product and information ties,
process  improvement,  to  distribution  and  service  integration.  Thus,  strategic
alliances include  all forms of cooperative  relationships  in Figure  2  between market
transactions  and  vertical  or  horizontal  integration,  relationships  sometimes  called
"hybrid arrangements"  (Borys and Jemison, 1989).
A CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK - THE  STRATEGIC  ALLIANCE LIFE CYCLE
There  is  an  extensive  literature  addressing  the  issues  concerning  strategic
alliances  and  joint ventures.  To  organize  the  issues  and  theory  in a  manner  that
provides relevance to academics, policy makers and managers,  we examine strategic
alliances using a strategic alliance life cycle framework.  We will discuss the issues in
the order  they must be addressed by alliance  participants, beginning with the need
and motivation for cooperation, progressing through alliance creation, operation and
maintenance,  and ending with the dissolution of the alliance. Table 1 summarizes the
key  issues,  factors  to  be  considered  and  theory  applicable  to  each  stage  of  the
strategic alliance life cycle.
Motivation For Cooperation
When  a  firm's  corporate  strategy  includes  entry  into  new  international
markets  or development  of new products or  services for those  markets,  one  of the
first  decisions  to  be  made  is  whether  the  expansion  should  be  undertaken
independently  or in cooperation  with an external  partner.  In making  this decision
several factors come into play.
Interaction  of Political  and Resource Related Factors. An initial motivational
assessment  is based on whether the primary  motivators for alliance  are  political or
resource  related.  Political  decisions  and  government  regulations  shape  many
international  business  arrangements.  Restrictions  on  foreign  ownership  and
participation in local economies,  financial incentives, rules on knowledge acquisition
or  relationship  preferences  of  government  and  quasi-government  agencies  for
domestic partners  all play a role in encouraging or coercing foreign firms to partner
with local companies.  Companies  also enter alliances to secure resources needed to
meet  strategic  objectives.  Das  et  al.  (1998)  categorized  resources  as  financial,
production,  distribution  and  managerial.  The  last  category  is  expanded  here  to
include  all  technical,  managerial  and  local  knowledge  related  to  R&D,  design,
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Analysis of the strength and interaction between political factors and resource
requirements  provides a measure of the need for the alliance and the challenges that
will arise in creating and maintaining it. It can also provide insight into strategies  for
alliance partners.  Consider the four quadrants of Figure 3. Firms in quadrant 1 have
little internal or  external  incentive  to enter a strategic  alliance  and  should proceed
independently.  Those  in quadrant 2  will use strategic  alliances  to secure necessary
resources,  without  the distorting  effects  of  political  interference.  Firms with  high
political motivation and low resource needs (Quadrant 3)  are frequently forced into
alliances  that  they  would  not  otherwise  have  entered.  This  may  stress  the
relationship  and, since resources  are not  scarce, organizational  compatibility should
be the primary focus.  Such alliances are at risk when the political  situation changes,
illustrated  by  the  reversion  of  ownership  to  many  multinationals  when  India
reversed its regulations  against foreign majority ownership of Indian subsidiaries3.
A quadrant  shift appeared  possible  in 1992 with  the Mexican  government's
reform of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution.  The reform modified Mexico's land
tenure  and  agricultural  investment policies  and laws,  relaxing  some restrictions  on
foreign ownership  of land and legalizing  the rental  of ejido land and the transfer of
property rights to private individuals.  Many thought the constitutional reform would
shift  some  firms  from  quadrant  3  to  1, eliminating  the  incentive  for  partnering.
However,  even with the reform  investment in farming was still restricted, both for
domestic and foreign firms, and  so joint ventures  and strategic  alliances remain the
norm.  Access  to quality land is  such an important  resource issue that most foreign
firms involved in agricultural production in Mexico are in quadrant 4.
Firms in Quadrant 4 have both political and resource incentives for creating an
alliance.  The  final  structure  of  the  relationship  is  often  shaped  by  the  political
considerations  and may evolve as regulations change, but the resource requirements
will provide incentive to continue the relationship.
Figure 3: Political and  Resource  Influences on  Strategic Alliances
Resource  Requirements
Low  High
Low  Quadrant  1  Quadrant 2
Political Factors
High  Quadrant 3  Quadrant 4
Source:  Compiled by Authors
3 Yashino and Rangan, Strategic Alliances, 1995 pg. 5-6.74  Policy Harmonization
Objectives for Strategic Alliances. The  specific  objectives  for firms  entering
strategic  alliances  may be further analyzed.  Agri-food  companies  enter alliances to
secure market  access,  supply  assurance  or  resources.  Four  traditional  explanations
for alliances are discussed in the literature:
*  Cartelizing an industry.
*  Sharing risk.
*  Bringing together complementary resources and capabilities, or
*  Surmounting barriers.
To  this  list  Badaracco  (1991)  adds  a  fifth  - sharing  embedded  knowledge,
knowledge  that is found  only  in the  structure,  relationships  and  people  of a firm.
Embedded  knowledge can  only be  accessed through prolonged  close relationships
between  firms.  Sharing  knowledge  through  alliances  is becoming  a more  common
theme in the literature (Hamel, 1991, Khanna, 1998).
In international  markets the incentives  for firms to create  alliances to achieve
these objectives is magnified.  New markets and  countries present barriers and risks
not found in domestic markets and there  are many factors  that may be mitigated by
working  with  local  organizations.  Typically,  resource  requirements  are  greater  in
international markets and both sides have much to learn from each other.
Drivers of  Strategic Alliances.  Firms  enter  strategic  alliances  as  part  of
corporate strategy and that strategy is being driven by several changes in the current
operating environment.
*  Globalization
Reduced trade  barriers, improved  logistics capabilities,  multiculturalism and
increased  interest  in  international  foods  have  all  stimulated  agri-food  trade  and
alliances.
*  Information Systems Capabilities
More  flexible  and  powerful  information  systems  allow  easier  integration  of
the  information  systems  of  different  organizations,  reducing  the  barriers  and
transactions  costs between them.
*Quality/Environmental  Systems
HACCP,  ISO  9000  and  ISO  14000  alter  the  way  organizations  think  about
internal  operations  and  their  relationships  with  partners.  The  drive  for  product
identity and traceability in food chains provides an added incentive for alliances.
*  Supply Chain Management
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Maximizing  performance  across  the network  of  organizations  making  up a
supply  chain  requires  high  levels  of  commitment  and  cooperation  among  chain
members. As organizations  seek to differentiate  their products and move away from
the price dominated competition of commodities,  they inevitably create longer term
and  closer  relationships  with  both  their  customers  and  suppliers.  Advances  in
biotechnology will allow agri-food products to be designed and produced for specific
niche markets that will require precise management of the supply chain.
*  Understanding Core Competencies  and Competitiveness
Managers  have  developed  a  greater  understanding  of  the  role  of  core
competencies  in corporate success.  With this awareness has come the realization that
competitiveness  can  be  enhanced  by  combining  complementary  capabilities  and
competencies  of different organizations in close, long-term relationships.
*  National Culture,  Policies and Preferences
Although political  obstacles to ownership and market entry are diminishing,
there are still national and cultural differences that make strategic  alliances attractive
vehicles for entering new markets.
The need for alliances has several theoretical underpinnings.  Transaction cost
theory proposes that firms enter alliances  to reduce the transaction  costs associated
with  entering  new  markets  (Jarillo  and  Stevenson,  1991,  Kogut  1988).  The
organizational  theory model attributes the formation of strategic  alliances to a firm's
reliance  on other  firms  in its environment  for  its resources  and  the firm's  need  to
reduce uncertainty  and to stabilize  the process  of acquiring  those resources  (Pfeffer
and Nowak, 1976). Porter (1980) suggests that firms enter into alliances in response to
competitive  pressure in  order to  achieve  competitive  advantages  through  low-cost
leadership, differentiation or focus strategies.
At the end of the first phase of the alliance life cycle a firm should understand
why an alliance is necessary  to implement corporate strategy and be prepared to  set
alliance resource requirements  and objectives.
Alliance Creation
Selecting a Partner. In the  second  phase  of  the strategic  alliance  life  cycle,
firms  select  partners  and  determine  alliance  structure.  Partner  compatibility  is
evaluated  on  several  dimensions  - objectives,  resources,  capabilities  and
competencies. While objectives for the two partners need not be identical they should
be compatible. Partner resources  and capabilities should complement those of other
alliance  members. Partners  require  a shared vision  of where the alliance  is heading
and whether  the needs  of partners  and the  reasons for allying are likely  to  change.
The  latter  is vital  to determining  alliance  form,  longer-term joint  venture versus  a
more fluid and flexible alliance.
Harvey  and  Lusch  (1995)  proposed  a  scoring  model  for  rating  partners,
analyzing prospects at the  macro-economic,  industry and firm levels. While  scoring
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models are useful for selecting the best alternatives from relatively large sets, in most
alliance  situations  the  set  of  suitable  candidates  is  relatively  small  and  issues  of
compatibility  of  corporate  culture  and  complementary  capabilities  are  most
important.  A scoring model does have the advantage  of ensuring that all important
factors in alliance formation are considered.
Nature  of  Alliance  Flows.  Badaracco  (1991)  categorizes  inter-firm
relationships  as  either  product  or  knowledge  links.  The  nature  of  the linkages  is
important  in  determining  alliance  form.  Where  linkages  and  flows  between
organizations  are  primarily product based,  sharing of knowledge  is limited  to that
required  to  exchange  products,  requiring  less  interaction  between  partners.  In
contrast, knowledge links are designed to share the knowledge and skills embedded
in the relationships,  procedures  and  people  in a firm.  This requires  prolonged  and
close  interaction,  dictating  an open  and  sharing  alliance  structure  often  achieved
through joint ventures.
The Role of Relationships. Alliances  result from the interaction of firms and
people  operating  in  a  network  of  related  businesses  (Gulati,1998;  Stabell,  1998).
Personal  and  business  relationships  influence  the  form,  evolution  and  ultimate
success of an alliance  (Gulati, 1998). When searching for alliance partners, companies
generally begin (and often end) with the firms and people they are already working
with.  In less industrialized  countries, personal relationship  building is frequently an
essential precursor to alliances (Lane and Beamish, 1995).
Relationships  played a major role in the Saskatchewan  Wheat Pool/CLJ joint
venture in Manzanillo.  Years of market transactions  between the two had resulted in
a  close  relationship  between  the  two companies  and  their  leaders.  SWP's  global
expansion  strategy dictated  securing  access  to grain  terminals  in global  ports.  CLJ
understood  Western  Mexican  grain  markets  and  had  a  plan  for  establishing  an
elevator  in  Manzanillo  but  lacked  financial  resources.  Based  on  its  favourable
relationship  with  SWP,  CLJ  approached  SWP  and  a  50/50  JV  grain terminal  was
created.
The  impact  of relationships  on strategic  alliance  success extends beyond  the
firms  directly  involved  in  the  alliance.  A  less  researched  aspect  of  inter-firm
relationships is the impact of clusters on organizational success. Porter (1998) defines
clusters  as "geographic  concentrations  of interconnected  firms and institutions  in a
particular  field."4 Porter  asserts  that untangling the paradox of location in a global
economy  offers  insights  into  how  companies  continually  create  competitive
advantage.  He observes that, "paradoxically,  the enduring competitive advantages in
a  global  economy  lie  increasingly  in  local  things  - knowledge,  relationships  and
motivation that distant rivals cannot match." 5
Clusters  exhibit  a  high  degree  of  competitive  success  that  results  from  the
complex interactions of multiple firms, working together and competing in ways that
4 M. Porter, Clusters and the New Economics of Competition. Harvard Business Review, Nov/Dec. 1998, pg.  78.
5Same as above.
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drive innovation  and  excellence  in the industry as  a whole.  Examples  of agri-food
clusters  include  the California  Wine cluster, mid-west  grain  and meat  clusters, the
further  processing/prepared  food  cluster  in  Toronto,  and  the  Sinaloa  winter
vegetable industry cluster.
Cluster  relationships  and  corporate  compatibility  were  the foundation  for a
successful  food  processing  joint  venture  in Ontario.  Five  small,  innovative,  food
processing  companies  who  dealt with  many  of the same  customers  and suppliers
recently joined  together  to create  Coming  Home  Foods,  a joint  venture producing
private label frozen foods for the U.S. market. The JV resulted from a meeting of the
company leaders to search for potential synergies and shared opportunities.
Contributions to  International Alliances.  Contributions  by  partners  in
international joint ventures vary. In a study of 70 joint ventures in Argentina,  Brazil,
Mexico, Turkey, Philippines and  India, Miller et al. (1996) compared motivation and
issues  between  industrial  country  firms  and  their  partners  in  less  industrialized
nations (Table 2).
Table  2:  Firm Contributions to International Joint Ventures
Less Industrialized Country Firm  %  of JV's citing  Industrial Country Firm  %  of JV's citing
Contribution  this category  Contribution  this category
Knowledge  of local politics  70  Process Technology  74
Knowledge  of government regulations  68  Product Technology  72
Knowledge of local customs  68  International  Reputation  70
Knowledge  of local markets  65  Finances  65
Provision of financing  58  Management  Knowledge  59
Local reputation  58
Access to  local market  54
Source:  Miller et al.  1996, pp. 6-7.
These findings parallel those of Trevino (1998) for Mexico. Foreign  companies
enter  into  ventures  with  Mexican  firms  to  gain  local  business  and  political
relationships  and  expertise  in return for  technology  and  expertise  in  reorganizing
organizational  structures.  In a study of Spanish joint ventures, Llaneza  and Garcia-
Canal (1998) noted that international JVs  tended to focus on acquiring knowledge of
local conditions,  business  practices  and  culture  whereas  domestic  JVs  place  more
emphasis  on  sharing  R&D  knowledge.  International  JVs  tended  to  have  fewer
partners  and less equitable sharing of equity while domestic  alliances  tended to  be
more a sharing between equals.  The inequity  tends to  be exacerbated  in JVs  in less
industrialized countries,  a result consistent with Beamish's findings (1988).
Risk and Structure. Alliance risk affects the choice of alliance form and control
mechanisms.  Das  and  Teng  (1998)  divide  alliance  risk  into  two  categories,
relationship  and  performance  risk.  Relationship  risk  is  attributable  to  a  firm's
involvement with outside  organizations.  Opportunistic behavior by one firm might
allow it to capture resources and knowledge  from their partner, often eliminating the
need for the alliance. Relationship risk only arises from firm to firm interaction.
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Performance  risk  is  attributable  to  the  alliance's  interaction  with  its
environment. Even if firms cooperate successfully there are still risks that the venture
will  not  succeed  due  to  partner  capability  shortcomings,  competition,  or
environmental  changes.
Firms enter strategic alliances  to reduce performance  risk, but the process  of
integrating  operations  with a  partner  exchanges  performance  risk for  relationship
risk.  Das  and  Teng  (1998)  relate  these  two  risks  to  four  resources  (financial,
technological,  physical  and  managerial)  prescribing  an  alliance  orientation
depending on a partner's main resource contribution and their most significant risk
concern.
Alliance form depends on the nature of flows,  objectives and risks involved in
the  relationship.  Joint  ventures  offer  advantages  of  greater  control  than  less
structured alliance forms at a cost of reduced flexibility. Once a form has been agreed
upon, finalizing agreements  remains a challenge.  Miller et al.  (1996) reported that in
joint venture  creation  two  issues dominated  the  discussions, equity  structure  and
technology  transfer.  Equity  structure  was  seen  as  the  most  important  and  most
difficult  issue  to  resolve.  An important  component  of any  alliance  agreement  is  a
well-defined  dispute  resolution  process  to  mitigate  the  impact  of  changing
circumstances  as well as exit provisions for both parties.
Alliance Management
Issues in Strategic Alliance Management.  Although  creating  alliances  is  a
challenge,  maintaining  them  is  far  more  difficult.  Bridging  international  and
organizational  cultural differences  can stress even the most compatible relationships.
The  most  significant  problems  for  international  joint ventures  tend  to  be  cultural
differences  (Miller  et  al.,  1996),  although  these  may  not  be  obvious  during  the
creation  phase.  As well,  differences  in corporate  culture between family  owned  vs
large  multinational or  multinational vs state owned bureaucratic  companies add to
alliance  management  difficulties  (Adarker et  al.,  1997).  Problems related  to multi-
nationality  figure  prominently  in  joint  ventures  between  large  multi-national
corporations  and smaller national  companies. Frequently cited issues include export
rights,  taxes,  dividend  and  investments,  differences  in  size,  capabilities,  decision-
making styles, reporting expectations and ability to invest in the venture.
Maintaining  flexibility  in a  relationship  is  essential,  so that  it can evolve  as
changes in the operating environment  or internal capabilities occur. Kumar and Seth
(1998) examine  the roles of strategic interdependence  and environmental  uncertainty
in  control  design  for  managing  joint  venture-parent  relationships.  They  define
strategic  interdependence  as  "a  function  of the  importance  and  extent  of  shared
resources"  and  environmental  uncertainty  as  "a  function  of  the  extent  and
importance  to  the  organization  of  changes  in  different  elements  in  the  task
environment"6 . Joint  venture  control  and  coordination  mechanisms  available  to
6  Kumar and Seth (1998), pg. 581-2.
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parent  companies  include  direct  contact  and  socialization  among  parent  and  JV
personnel,  structure and  role of the JV board in JV management,  incentives  and JV
management staffing.
Parent  - JV  relationships  represent  a  tradeoff  between  the  JV's  need  for
independence  to  respond  to  environmental  uncertainty  and  the  parent's  need  to
integrate  JV  activities  with  its  strategy.  Kumar  and  Seth found  that  the  need  for
strategic  interdependence  resulted  in increased use of all but JV staffing to align JV
activities with those  of the parent.  In situations  of high environmental  uncertainty
JV's require  independence  and  the ability to respond quickly  and independently  to
environmental  changes. Such circumstances  had a moderating effect on contact and
integrative mechanisms and the internal role of the JV board (Kumar and Seth, 1998).
The  Role  of Learning in  Strategic Alliance Evolution.  Alliances  in  which
organizations  attempt  to  learn from  each  other  frequently  develop  into  "learning
races"  where participants seek to learn faster than their partners  and internalize the
other's competencies  (Hamel,  1991;  Tei,  1997).  Considering  the difference  between
private benefits  accruing  to a single  partner and  common benefits  accruing to both
partners  helps  put  learning  races  into  context  (Khanna  et al.,  1998).  Incentives  to
invest in the alliance depend on the ratio of private to common benefits for the firms
involved and their relative progress  toward learning objectives.  As a firm gets ahead
in  the  learning  race,  it  has  more  incentive  to  invest  to  capture  the  benefits.  The
lagging firm has incentive to reduce its investment. Understanding learning races can
help participants comprehend the changing nature of their relationship.
Just as changes in political regulations may move firms from quadrants 3 or 4
to 1 or 2, technology  advancements,  organizational  learning  and improved  internal
capabilities may move firms from quadrants  2 to 1 or 4 to 3. Such changes will alter
the motivation for the alliance, requiring it to evolve or terminate.
Alliance Dissolution
International  expansion  is  inherently  risky  and  the  level  of  dissatisfaction
within strategic alliances has been found to be extremely high. The rate of success  for
both international alliances and cross-border acquisitions is approximately 50 percent
(Bleeke and  Ernst,  1991).  Even  if an alliance  is  successful,  changing  environmental
conditions  or  corporate  capabilities  frequently  reduce  the need  for the  alliance  for
one  or  both partners.  The average  life  of a  strategic alliance  is  seven years  and 80
percent  of joint ventures  result in the  sale  by one  partner  to the other  (Bleeke  and
Ernst,  1991,  1995).  Bleeke  and  Ernst  (1995)  divided  strategic  alliances  into  six
categories and concluded that only the alliance of two strong, non-competing firms is
likely to result in a sustainable long-term alliance.
Since  unanticipated  shifts  in  corporate  capabilities,  strategy  or  the
environment  can  change  the need for  a strategic  alliance,  it is  essential  that  firms
consider strategies for determining when and how an alliance will be dissolved from
the  beginning.  This  includes  prescribing  conditions  for  reviewing  alliance
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partners from the alliance if necessary. Disengagement  strategies can help reduce the
financial and operational  costs associated with dissolving an alliance.
We  will examine  characteristics  and examples  of strategic alliances  and joint
ventures under NAFTA at three levels. We will begin at the agri-food sector level and
then examine experiences  within a single industry and region, the Sinaloa vegetable
industry.  We  will  end  by  considering  the  inter-firm  experiences  of  a  single
agribusiness family, the Ley family of Mexico.  Many of these alliances began prior to
NAFTA and may or may not be related to any specific  NAFTA effects.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS  OF STRATEGIC  ALLIANCES AND JOINT
VENTURES  UNDER  NAFTA
Motivation for Cooperation
For  international  partners  in  NAFTA  agri-food  alliances,  the  two  primary
objectives for forming alliances are either market entry or sourcing related. Domestic
partner objectives, on the other hand, tend to be finance, knowledge and technology
acquisition but may include sourcing.
The external partner in market entry relationships  generally searches for local
knowledge, distribution  and marketing capabilities  and  provides domestic partners
with technical  skills and  financing.  Market entry  alliances  are  formed  at all  levels.
Food  service  distributor  AmeriServe  Food  Distribution  Inc.  joined  in  a  strategic
alliance  with  MetroRichelieu  Inc.  gaining  distribution  in  the  Eastern  Canadian
market and providing MetroRichelieu  with access to AmeriServe's product lines. The
alliance is market entry for one partner and sourcing related for the other. Wal-Mart's
joint ventures  with food retailer  Cifra  of Mexico  secured  Wal-Mart's  access  to  the
Mexican market  in return for capital,  and expertise  in technology  and information
systems.
Sourcing related alliances abound  at the production  and primary distribution
levels. The numerous alliances between grain giants ADM and Cargill are examples
of arrangements  designed  to  secure  grain  supplies.  The  ADM  alliance  with  UGG
exhibits the sourcing/finance exchange between internal and external partners. UGG
received  cash  necessary  for  continued  operations  from  ADM  and  a  Japanese
customer  Marabuli,  for whom UGG was  a preferred  supplier.  ADM and  Marabuli
secured access to Canadian terminals and grain supplies.  Note that ADM's alliances
are not  restricted  to either sourcing  or  NAFTA jurisdictions.  A recent joint venture
between ADM and Lesaffre et Compagnie brought operations in France, Canada and
the  United  States  into  the  International  Malting  Company.  This enabled  them  to
globalize  brewing  and  malting  capabilities  and  increase  efficiency,  while
simultaneously  securing  better  access  to  premium  barley  supplies  and  varieties.
Similarly Cargill's  expansion in Canada through joint ventures  with Canadian grain
and  farm retail companies  may  be viewed  as  exchanges  of cash  and  management
resources in return for sourcing and marketing opportunities.  It is interesting to note
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that while the alliances form part of Cargill's Canadian strategy, in Mexico Cargill has
chosen to proceed primarily through acquisition.
Alliance Creation
Alliance  Structure.  Agri-food  alliances  vary  in  their  organization  and
structure but common general structures include:
*  Licensing agreements
Kerry  Foods  of  Wisconsin  and  Ireland  serviced  Canadian  ingredients
customers through  a licensing agreement with Beatrice Foods from 1988 until  1993,
when a disagreement caused it to take back its technology.  The market demanded a
mixture  of physical  product and knowledge  that could only be supplied  by a local
firm.  The  product  based  alliance  failed  to  meet  market  requirements.  Ultimately
Kerry acquired a Canadian ingredients  company.
*Sole  supplier arrangements
For example, Mezban, an Ontario producer of Indian condiments selected W.J.
Clark, a Chicago based food product marketing firm, as its sole marketing partner for
the U.S. market.
*  Strategic alliances
These  are  non-investment  relationships  where  partners  work  together  in a
variety of ways.  These are common in relationships  focusing on product exchange,
such as in the fresh produce industry discussed in the next section.
*  Minority investments in domestic firms
Many of the grain examples cited in the introduction fall into this category, as
do investments by companies like Labatt's in the Mexican brewing industry.
*  Joint ventures resulting in the creation of a new entity
Coming  Home  Foods of  Toronto  and XCAN  are  examples  of organizations
established  to  increase  scope  and  reduce  transaction  costs  for  partner  firms.  A
significant difference between these two is that the partners in Coming Home Foods
offer  complementary  products  to  the  JV  while  those  of  XCAN  offer  competing
products. The latter alliance is coming under increasing pressure as participants  like
Saskatchewan  Wheat Pool move into  direct competition  with the JV and  the other
participant  Agricore. The  venture continues to market canola but the proportion  of
other grains flowing through the organization is decreasing.
Nature of Alliance Exchanges - Product or Knowledge.  The  nature  of  the
primary  exchanges  between  partners  influences  the  suitability  of  the  different
arrangements.  Product-based alliances run the complete range of alliance structures
from sole sourcing  to joint ventures. These alliances involve lower relationship risks
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Knowledge  based  alliances  frequently  use  an  exchange  of  ownership  to
control  the  use  and  flow  of  knowledge  and  technology.  Technology  alliances  are
found  throughout  the  agri-food  system,  from  input  suppliers  to  producers  and
processors.  They  include  technologies  ranging  from  relatively  basic  process
technologies  to highly  sophisticated  production  and  biotechnologies.  For example,
Emery Corporation  of Toronto supplies the much larger Grupo Vitep's Celatep joint
venture with used equipment and expertise in paper carton manufacturing  and has
an  ownership  stake  in  Celatep.  Grupo  Vitep's  Avibel  subsidiary  has  a  strategic
alliance  with  Canadian  firm  Innovatech  to  acquire  expertise  and  technology  in
dehydrating  egg  yolks.  This  is just  one  of Grupo  Vitep's  technology  based  joint
ventures  with  foreign  firms.  While  there  is  a  preference  toward  North  American
partners,  Grupo Vitep is also involved in alliances with Swiss, Danish,  German and
Spanish  firms, firms which make everything from mayonnaise  to feed and vaccines.
UFL  Foods  of  Toronto  supplies  a  combination  of  ingredients  technology  and
knowledge  to its California JV partners  Candor/Precision  Blending.  Much of UFL's
international  growth  may  be  attributed  to its  extensive  use  of  alliances  and  joint
ventures.
Alliances  and joint ventures among  the NAFTA  partners have  also involved
Mexican firms pursuing market access,  technology  acquisition  or other  goals in the
U.S. and Canadian markets. Empresas La Moderna (ELM), recently renamed Savia, is
one of the largest in scope, complexity and investment.  In 1985 ELM, led by Alfonso
Romo, embarked on a diversification strategy away from its core business of cigarette
manufacturing, into agro-biotechnology.  ELM entered the vegetable seed industry, by
acquiring and merging  Asgrow, Peto-seed, and Royal Sluis into its Seminis division.
Entrance  into  the  biotech  field  was  achieved  via  an alliance  with,  and  ultimately
complete  acquisition  of,  DNA  Plant  Technology  Corp  (DNAP).  A  network  of
strategic technology and investment alliances with universities and private firms has
enabled ELM to achieve  a global position in vegetable biotech and germplasm.  ELM
has numerous knowledge links with Monsanto. DNAP recently acquired Monsanto's
strawberry  development  program,  gaining  exclusive  rights  to  existing  gene
technology  and  a  nonexclusive  right  to  future  Monsanto  berry  technology,  of all
types. ELM and Monsanto also signed a technology collaboration agreement through
which  Monsanto  will  become  a  "preferred  provider"  of  agronomic  quality  traits
developed through biotechnology.
ELM  is  also involved  in product exchanges.  Its  position in North American
fruit and vegetable production and marketing was established via a series of alliances
and  acquisitions,  all  grouped  under  the  Fresh  Produce  Co.  umbrella,  a  DNAP
subsidiary.  Partial,  and  later  total,  acquisition  of  a large  Sinaloa  winter  vegetable
exporter  (RB Packing,  Master's Touch label)  and joint ventures with growers  in the
United States widened product lines and extended shipping seasons. ELM integrated
forward by acquiring wholesale market operations  in the United Sttates and Canada.
This represents  one of the first times a Mexican produce firm has forward-integrated
into the U.S. marketing system beyond the level of a Nogales distributorship.
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Alliance Maintenance
Once  an  alliance  is  established,  it  must  be  managed  in  the  face  of  both
environmental  and  internal  changes.  The  former  may  alter  the  competitive  and
regulatory environments, and the latter can shift the relative knowledge and resource
positions  of  the  partners.  Hence,  flexibility  and  planning  are  assets  in  alliance
survival and evolution. In 1991, when Wal-Mart and Cifra began their joint venture to
expand  Cifra's  stores they  included  provisions  for  sharing its  future  development
equally. They later displayed the ability to adapt to unforeseen  events. When the Peso
collapsed in 1994,  Cifra  responded by taking  full control of the JV while Wal-Mart
provided financial backing in return for an increased stockholding position in Cifra.
While  the  partnership  continues,  its  nature  has  altered  from  one  of  shared
responsibilities  to  one  approaching  an  international  subsidiary  relationship.
Reflecting  the  importance  of  effective  communication  in  successful  relations,
Jeronimo  Arango,  Chairman  of  Cifra  was  appointed  to  the  Wal-Mart  Board  of
Directors in 1997.
Another example  of providing options is Con Agra's initial JV agreement with
Grupo Desc. This involved the purchase of 20 percent of its Universa meat processing
subsidiary with the option to purchase 29.9 percent more.
Alliance Dissolution
The  reasons for alliance  dissolution may be  divided into two groups,  those
related  to  the  performance  of  the  venture  and  those  related  to  altered  partner
capabilities  or objectives.  In the first category,  Fleming Cos.  Of Oklahoma  recently
exited its joint venture with Grupo Gigante of Mexico City. Established in 1992, the JV
operated  five  stores. The  American  store format was not popular with  consumers
and  in 1998 Grupo Gigante purchased  Fleming's share of the JV. A production joint
venture  between  Dole  and  the  Canelos  Group  to  produce  tomatoes  in  Mexico
ultimately  failed  because  of weather  shocks  and  water  shortages  which  impaired
performance.  In  addition, the expected  marketing advantages  from Dole's national
distribution system and branded marketing program never materialized.  Dissolution
was  facilitated by the fact that it was a product only joint venture and both parties
had always met their financial and other obligations to each other. Since the Canelos
alliance  needs  have  not  changed  significantly,  the  company  recently  entered  an
alliance with Chiquita to produce and market tomatoes and other produce.
Similarly,  dissolution  can  occur  because  the  partners  evolve  in  different
directions  or  discover  that  their  objectives  are  not  sufficiently  compatible.  The
ultimate result  of many alliances  and JVs  is the acquisition  of alliance assets by one
partner. In some cases, sale to a partner was not due to alliance failure, rather,  it was
but one step in the strategy of either or both parties.  In these instances  the  alliance
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INDUSTRY  LEVEL EXPERIENCES:  THE SINALOA WINTER VEGETABLE
INDUSTRY
Firm-level reactions  to trade liberalization vary  greatly by commodity sector.
In the North  American  fruit and  vegetable  industry,  product perishability  and  the
seasonality  of supply and demand are major determinants  of industry structure and
procedures.  Industry  fundamentals  have  caused  the  North  American  fruit  and
vegetable  sector  to  exhibit  marked  patterns  of  specialization  across  several
dimensions, including geography, seasons, product lines and markets.
Changes in the last two decades have encouraged joint ventures and strategic
alliances between Mexican grower-exporters  and U.S. firms, mainly from California,
Arizona,  Florida and  Texas.  Consumers  demand  year-round  availability  of a wide
line of fresh fruits and vegetables  with higher expectations  of quality and safety.  At
the  same time,  consolidation in the  grocery and  distribution industries has reduced
the  number  of buyers.  These buyers  expect  large  volume,  year round  supply and
broader  product lines  from their  suppliers  encouraging redundancy  in production
and  geographic  diversification  of  supply.  Redundancy  through  geographic
diversification  enables  shippers to better assure supply in the event of a weather or
disease problem in one growing region. The need to trace products through an entire
supply chain has also encouraged firms to maintain closer relationships and alliances
with their upstream partners.
Product,  seasonal  and  geographic  diversification  strategies  give  shippers  a
competitive  advantage and decrease marketing risk but they greatly increase capital
requirements  and  total production risk exposure. To better  manage production risk,
shippers seek partnerships with knowledgeable growers in different regions, creating
upstream  joint  ventures  and  alliances  with  Mexican  firms.  Although  this  market-
driven trend toward  cooperation would have continued in the absence of NAFTA, it
has been facilitated and accelerated with Mexico's accession to the GATT in 1986, the
implementation  of CUSTA and subsequently NAFTA.
The  Sinaloa Vegetable  Cluster
The  state  of  Sinaloa  dominates  the  Mexican  horticultural  export  industry;
accounting  for two-thirds  of Mexican  fruit and  vegetable  exports  and much  of the
over  $1.9  billion  in  Mexican  horticultural  export  volume  covered  by  strategic
alliances and joint ventures. Sinaloa is the principal location for winter production of
a narrow line of fresh vegetables,  both for export and  domestic consumption.  These
include  primarily:  tomatoes,  bell  and other  peppers,  cucumbers,  squash,  eggplant,
and snap beans.
In  "The  Competitive  Advantage  of  Nations"  (1990),  Porter  specified  the
determinants  of  national  competitive  advantage  as  an  interaction  of  four
components:  firm strategy,  structure and rivalry; related  and supporting industries,
factor  conditions  and  demand  conditions.  Dynamic  domestic  demand  helps
stimulate  the  development  of an industry  and  vigorous  inter-firm  rivalry leads  to
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innovation  and  productivity  gains.  Competitive  industries  must  also  have
advantageous factor conditions and competent related and supporting industries.
High  Mexican  per  capita  consumption  of  tomatoes,  sustained  rapid
population growth,  income  growth  during certain  periods,  combined  with limited
competition  during  the  winter  months  within  Mexico,  meant  that  the  Sinaloa
industry  not only  benefitted  from  robust domestic  demand,  but was  essentially  a
monopoly supplier to its domestic market. On the export side, Sinaloa competed as a
duopolist with the Florida winter  vegetable  industry, originally a  much larger  and
well-financed  industry.  However,  these quasi-monopoly  and  duopoly positions  are
only  at  the industry  level, with  a  high level  of inter-firm  rivalry  within  both  the
Florida and Sinaloa industries.  For both industries  this has stimulated the adoption
of new varieties and technological  packages, leading to greater  productivity, quality
and for Sinaloa, greater market penetration into both the Canadian and U.S. markets.
In recent years, the Sinaloa winter vegetable export industry has evolved as a
dynamic cluster.  Michael Porter's  (1988) message on the importance  of clusters  and
relationships  resonates  well  in  the fresh  produce  industry  context,  described  as  a
"people"  business,  with personal  relationships  and  local  knowledge  predominant.
Perishables  are  non-durable  items  with  rapid  sales  turnover,  so  lack  of  payment
cannot  be remedied  by  repossession  of  goods.  Because  of  the  quick,  continuous
nature  of  spot market  transactions,  handshake  deals  are  common.  Trust  between
buyers  and  sellers  is  paramount,  leading  to  reliance  on  intuition  and  the
development of personal relationships.
The need to identify trustworthy,  competent partners with local knowledge  is
especially important to the Mexican and U.S. sourcing interface.  In the past, cultural
and  underlying  value  differences  have complicated  business  relationships.  As  the
Sinaloa  cluster  developed,  so  did  a  shared  experience,  which  helped  to  reduce
information and other transaction costs and contributed to Sinaloa's  ability to attract
the bulk of foreign investment in the Mexican horticultural sector.
Ample  water  supplies,  attractive  winter  growing conditions,  minimal freeze
risk,  an  abundant  supply  of  labor,  and  geographic  proximity  to  the  U.S.  border
(Nogales, Az.) all helped establish the Sinaloa winter vegetable industry. Capital was
provided  by  large  Mexican  growers  and  through  alliances  with  U.S.  importers
seeking year-round availability  of product. A cluster evolved, beginning with Sinaloa
growers and U.S. firms. Sinaloan firms share knowledge  of local growing conditions,
legal/institutional  frameworks,  ways  of  doing business  in  Mexico,  and  access  to
land,  labor  and  water.  U.S.  firms  share  knowledge  of  the  North  American
distribution  system,  production  financing  and  in some  cases  technical  production
and post-harvest handling assistance.
Allied  industries,  like  input  suppliers,  have  been attracted  to this  region  to
serve the industry in its drive  to become  more intensive in the use  of resources. The
industry  is  breaking  more  new  ground  by  shifting  into  hothouse  production  of
specialty tomatoes, European cucumbers and specialty Israeli and Dutch varieties  of
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colored  sweet  peppers.  While  hothouse  production  is  very  costly  from  a  capital
investment  and  operating  cost  per  hectare  basis,  the  high  yields  partially
compensate,  making  per unit costs less prohibitive relative to field  production.  The
development of the hothouse industry reflects a strategy for controlling the growing
environment,  thereby producing more consistent quality and volumes, in response to
the growing demand of large buyers for supply consistency.
This  emerging  "high-tech"  industry  is  attracting  new  U.S.  investors  to the
Mexican winter vegetable industry, both via acquisition and joint ventures. Alliances
and acquisitions are also occurring among input suppliers seeking to capture more of
the  "value  chain"  as the  industry  shifts  to more  expensive  varieties  and  growing
techniques,  often with differentiated product attributes.
The  establishment  of  the  Sinaloa  winter  vegetable  cluster,  with  its  strong
international  linkages  and  investment  ties,  offers  an  opportunity  to  examine  the
experience  with  joint  ventures  and  strategic  alliances  between  NAFTA  partners,
without  identifying  causality  as  necessarily  related  to  NAFTA.  While  Sinaloa
experienced  foreign investment long prior to NAFTA, the structure  of joint ventures
and  alliances  seems  to  have  been  gradually  changing  since  NAFTA,  although
probably more due to independent drivers than to NAFTA itself.
In the past, few arrangements  referred to as "joint ventures" involved creating
either separate JV entities or long-term alliances. Instead the focus was on simple and
seasonal  product  exchange,  with  arrangements  referred  to  as "deals."  Disputes  or
changing  conditions  commonly  caused  them to be  dissolved  after  only one  or two
seasons with each  party seeking new partners.  Deals usually involved  the importer
(often a U.S. shipper of the same commodities)  sharing production costs and market
risk  with  the  grower.  However,  the  importer  generally  charged  a  marketing
commission  that included  a provision  for profit, while the grower might not receive
any  return  if market  prices  were below  the  landed  cost  in Nogales.  On the other
hand,  for  products  with  domestic  markets  in Mexico,  the importer faced  the  risk
associated  with the  practice of "backdooring."  After  accepting production advances
from the importer,  the producer might deliver  little product preferring to market it
domestically  if local prices  were higher than export prices.  The conflicts  associated
with these more limited commercial,  rather than truly strategic arrangements,  made
them inherently unstable.
Over  time,  more  strategic  arrangements  have evolved,  where  growers  and
importers have jointly developed production and marketing  "programs"  designed to
meet interdependent  strategic  objectives for both.  These new alliances recognize  the
mutual dependency  of importer  and grower  and the need  to maintain relationships
over  time,  particularly  important  for  firms  launching  branded  or  differentiated
products,  such as  high-value  hothouse  tomatoes  and  colored  peppers.  To  achieve
market success  these products must have a consistent  marketing presence,  in terms
of quality,  volumes  and  promotional programs.  This  requires constant information
and  technology  exchange  and investments  that can't be realized  on a single season
basis.  Hence,  a few  formal joint ventures  have  emerged,  involving  the  creation  of
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separate  joint  venture  companies,  lasting  over  extended  time  periods,  with  a
common culture emerging. R & D has become a factor in some of these relationships
as  seed  companies  acquire  shippers  and  trace-back  capabilities  also  grow  in
importance.  In other words,  the increasing  level  of technical sophistication  in both
production and marketing are having an impact.
FIRM  LEVEL EXPERIENCES:  THE CASE  OF THE  LEY FAMILY
Insight  into  strategic  alliances  may  be  gleaned  by  examining  the  diverse
experiences  of the  Ley  family,  from  Culiacan,  Sinaloa.  Active  at  all  levels  of the
Mexican agri-food sector; the Ley family has participated in a series of joint ventures
and  strategic  alliances  with  U.S.  firms  over  the  last  twenty  years.  Many  have
progressed  through their  entire life  cycle,  while others  continue.  Three  cooperative
ventures are highlighted here.
Ley/Safeway  - Supermarket  Joint Venture
In 1979 the Ley family, owners of a supermarket chain, Casa Ley, established a
retail joint venture with Safeway. The original motivation for creating the retail joint
venture  was  financial  for Casa  Ley,  and political/market  access for Safeway.  Casa
Ley's  need  for  a  strong  financial  partner  emerged  in  the  aftermath  of  a  major
devaluation  of  the  peso.  Safeway  had  a  strategic  interest  in  international
diversification  but  Mexican  law  limited  foreign  ownership  in  the  Mexican  food
distribution system to  49 percent.  Safeway  also needed  a Mexican  partner to learn
local business practices,  especially  given the  political and institutional paradigm  of
public sector  direct  intervention  in the  food production  and  marketing system.  In
addition,  Safeway  did not possess the consumer  marketing  expertise  necessary  to
compete in the newly evolving Mexican supermarket sector.
A separate  joint venture was created  and new  stores were  opened.  Safeway
initially owned 49 percent of the shares, but increased its position to 50 percent when
permitted by the 1989 modifications  to Mexican foreign investment regulations.
As  of 1998 the endeavor had grown  to 73  supermarkets  located  throughout
Northwestern Mexico. Growth was financed entirely by reinvestment of joint venture
profits.  The  joint  venture  has  been  successfully  maintained  because  the  initial
objectives were met and the firms have continued to adapt to the dynamic Mexican
supermarket, macroeconomic and general policy environment. Safeway continues to
benefit  from  Casa  Ley's  operational  and  market  expertise  while  Casa  Ley  gains
Safeway expertise in technical,  administrative and corporate structures and systems.
The  distribution  of  benefits  has  been  acceptable  to  both  parties,  and  relatively
balanced  bargaining  power  has  contributed  to  a  sustainable  relationship,  despite
changes in the institutional/political  framework that now permit and simplify direct
foreign investment in food retailing.
The  fact  that  alliance  success  is  dependent  on the  successful  alignment  of
multiple  factors  is  illustrated  by  the  ultimate  demise  of  another  Ley/Safeway
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relationship.  These  two  partners  were  unsuccessful  in  maintaining  a  vertically
oriented  joint  venture  between  Safeway  and  the  winter  vegetable  production
operations  of the Ley family.  Objectives  were not sufficiently  compatible when one
party focused on grower considerations while the other concentrated on its needs as
a retailer.  Without  a shared  vision of the  relationship  and  its future  as a  guide the
alliance proved to be short-lived.
Ley/Sun World International  Strategic Alliance
Shortly  after  the  Ley/Safeway  winter  vegetable  failure,  Ley  developed  a
strategic  alliance  with  U.S.  grower-shipper,  Sun  World  International,  to  produce
proprietary varieties of long shelf-life vine-ripe tomatoes and sweet, colored peppers.
Sun World International had an exclusive license to seed varieties developed by LSL,
an Israeli vegetable seed firm.  Access  to these differentiated  varieties was restricted
to grower partners who paid royalties to Sun World for their use. Sun World also had
considerable  experience  in  marketing  branded  high  value  vegetables  in  the  U.S.
market.  Ley  entered  the  alliance  to  secure  access  to  the  seed  technology  and  to
acquire  a  U.S.  marketing  partner.  Sun  World  motivations  were  sourcing  related,
securing access  to Ley's production capabilities, and a disciplined  grower partner for
conducting  further  R&D  on  their  proprietary  seed  varieties.  The  ability  and
willingness  of the  Ley partners  to conduct  carefully  controlled  seed  trials  was  an
important motivator for Sun World.
Sun  World  and  Ley  structured  a  production  joint  venture  contract  (not a
separate  entity),  sharing  operating  costs  and  splitting  profits  and  losses  on  a
50-50 basis. An alliance also existed on the marketing side, where Sun World was the
exclusive  marketer  for  their proprietary  varieties  and  Ley  paid  a  fixed  marketing
commission  per  box  sold.  With  the  exception  of  the  proprietary  varieties  and
corresponding royalties, the structure  of the Sun World-Ley alliance was the norm for
the Sinaloa winter vegetable sector.
The  alliance  operated  for  several  seasons,  but  at  the  same  time  the  Leys
marketed  other  varieties  independently  through  their  existing  Nogales
distributorship.  This afforded  them an opportunity to compare the net returns from
both marketing operations. The Ley's concluded that despite the beneficial  technical
and  marketing  learning  with  Sun  World,  the  alliance  did  not  provide  sufficient
benefits over operating  independently.  This was in part due to patent complications
which caused Sun World to  lose exclusive  control of the  tomato varieties, allowing
competing  seed  firms  to  offer  equal  or  superior  alternatives  accessible  without
royalties.  The  loss of licensing royalties,  legal  costs associated with  defense against
patent  infringement,  and  other  business  problems  contributed  to  serious  financial
difficulties  for  Sun-World.  From  the  Ley  perspective,  Sun  World  was  no longer  a
viable partner and the alliance dissolved amicably.
Ley/NT Gargiulo Joint Ventures
Subsequent to the Sun World alliance,  an innovative set of joint ventures was
established  between  the  Ley  family  and  NT  Gargiulo,  at  the time  the largest  U.S.
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tomato shipper. NT Gargiulo was involved in year-round production and marketing,
with production facilities in Florida, California, the East Coast and Puerto Rico.
The  Gargiulo  family  sought  redundancy  in production  to  reduce  weather-
induced marketing risk in supplying national retail and foodservice  accounts. For the
Gargiulo's, NAFTA apparently was one of several substantive changes affecting their
perception  of  the  competitiveness  of  the  Sinaloa  industry.  To  paraphrase  Jeff
Gargiulo's  position  at  the time,  "While  my  fellow  Florida  shippers  are  going  to
Washington,  D.C.  to  seek  governmental  redress  from  the  effects  of  trade
liberalization,  I was going to Mexico." At the same time, U.S. retail demand for vine-
ripe tomatoes, grown primarily in Sinaloa, was rising.  By 1994, several years of R&D
in  Sinaloa  had  resulted  in  vine-ripe  varieties  with  improved  shelf  life,  yields,
uniformity,  flavor  and  appearance.  R  & D  provided  another  incentive  for  the
Gargiulo  family, who needed different  locations  to test new varieties resulting from
an alliance with Monsanto.
Although NT Gargiulo was a market leader in the production of mature-green
tomatoes,  it had little  experience  producing and  marketing vine-ripe  tomatoes  and
no  experience  producing  in  Mexico.  While  the  1992  reform  to  Article  27  of  the
Mexican  Constitution  allowed  for  corporate  investment  in  farming,  legal  and
practical barriers  to producing  independently  still existed. For example, there  were
limits  on  the  amount  of  land  that  any  one  farmer  could  own  (100  hectares  for
irrigated row crops), as well as barriers to gaining access to quality land, via rental or
ownership  arrangements.  These  barriers,  compounded  by  the  need  for  obtaining
local technical  production  expertise,  provided NT Gargiulo  with both political  and
resource incentives  to find a local partner in Mexico.
From the Ley perspective,  an important motivating factor was to obtain "true"
risk sharing.  The  production  of winter  vegetables  entails  sizeable  investment  and
risk. For example, tomato production and packing costs often exceed  $12,000/hectare
or $1 million/season  for even medium scale operators.  Ley felt that the typical joint
venture  contract prevailing  in  the  Sinaloa industry  between  Mexican  growers  and
U.S. distributors or shippers was not true risk sharing. The marketer (a distributor or
shipper) was assured  income from the marketing commissions  paid by the growers
while the grower usually absorbed  most of the production risk. Ley was looking for
joint ventures that better incorporated both production and marketing risk.
Two  separate  joint  ventures  were  created,  structured  to  meet  the  shared
objective of a year-round presence of superior quality, branded tomatoes in the North
American  market.  Partner  selection was  based on the proven history of the firms,
their sound financial positions, and  on their production,  distribution and marketing
capabilities.  The  difficulty in evaluating and sharing ownership in existing physical
infrastructure  caused  them  to  exclude  existing  physical  investments  from  the
relationship.  Instead,  they jointly capitalized  and shared the operating costs for two
separate joint venture entities, one for production and the other for distribution. The
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Likening an alliance to a marriage,  one of the partners noted that "an intrinsic
effort  is  required  in  keeping  it  going."  Firm  type  and  culture  influenced  the
relationship;  the  fact  that  both  were  growers  enabled  them  to  communicate
effectively,  in  contrast to  the  Ley/Safeway  vegetable  production  alliance.  The  on-
going  exchange  of  embedded  knowledge  between  these  firms  over  the  last  six
seasons appears  to be an important factor contributing to the success of the alliance.
Both have improved their competency  in producing and marketing branded Sinaloa
winter  vegetables.  The  alliance  has enabled  them  to better meet  the  needs  of the
consolidating retail sector and together they have increasingly  sought contracts with
preferred  suppliers  to  guarantee  availability,  prices  and  traceback  capabilities.
Although Gargiulo  has learned  about producing  winter vegetables  in Sinaloa,  that
firm  is  probably  no  closer  to  producing  independently  there,  due  to  continuing
resource  and political constraints.
Lessons Learned
Ley's  experiences  illustrate  the  benefits  and  also  the  difficulties  and  risks
involved  in  strategic  alliances.  In  the  Ley/Safeway  alliances  both  political  and
resource factors  motivated the partners.  The supermarket alliance survived  because
both parties remained committed to the industry and the venture and shared a vision
of  its  future.  Conversely,  the  production/marketing  alliance  failed  because  both
parties focused  on their own needs, which were different from those of their partner.
The  Ley/Safeway  alliances  also  illustrated  the  fact  that  compatibility  in  one
relationship is no guarantee of success in the next.
Complementary capabilities and shared objectives of joint profit maximization
helped  create and  maintain the  Ley/Gargiulo  alliance.  Initial partner requirements
included  tests of capital,  technical expertise,  and the ability to produce  and market
large,  consistent  volumes  of  product.  Since  both  firms  had  core  competencies  in
production  and  distribution there  was no  weak link, but each  required  the other's
expertise in their home country. While cultural differences have been somewhat of an
issue, this factor has been minimized both by the Ley family's close ties with the U.S.
culture and the "grower culture"  the partners share.
On the other hand, in the case of Sun World-Ley, joint profit maximization was
not a clearly defined goal. Ley learned about branded marketing in the United States
from  Sun  World,  lessening  Ley's  need  for  the  alliance.  Issues  related  to  both
performance and relationship risk were likely present in the Sun World-Ley alliance.
In  the meantime,  most  players  in the  Sinaloa/Nogales  industry  still  retain
traditional alliances that are limited to commercial sales transactions  and are seasonal
rather than strategic  in nature. These alliances will be tested in future as fewer, larger
buyers  attempt  to  develop  closer  partnerships  with  preferred  suppliers,
implementing  supply  chain  management  techniques.  These  new  requisites  are
causing some U.S. shippers to produce directly in Mexico, by renting land and hiring
their  own managers,  as a  strategy  for maximizing  control  as part  of a year-round
program.  While  this option is  permitted by the reform of Article  27, it remains  the
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exception  with both  political  and  resource  factors  still causing  most  U.S.  firms to
share risk with Mexican partners.
SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSIONS
The structure  of the agri-food  sector is  evolving dramatically  in response  to
internal  and  external  pressures.  The  nature  of  relationships  among  agri-food
organizations at all levels of the food system, from plant and animal genetics through
to retail and food-service organizations  is changing.  Firms are  attempting to reduce
transaction  costs, food  safety and  other  risks,  relying  less on the spot market,  and
developing closer ties with suppliers and other partners.
Strategic alliances  and joint ventures  play an increasingly  important  role  in
inter-organizational  relationships,  allowing  firms  to  capture  benefits  from  new
markets  more  quickly  and  at  lower  risk  than  through  horizontal  or  vertical
integration strategies.  The  rapid  rate  of change in competitive  markets  means  that
companies  may  not have  the  time  to develop  necessary  resources  and  capabilities
internally.  This  is  clearly  the  case  among  NAFTA  participants,  as  a  plethora  of
alliances  were identified  in the North American  agri-food sector.  Incentives  to ally
will remain and foreign direct investment (FDI) among the NAFTA partners in each
other's agri-food systems will continue to grow, along with sales of affiliates in their
neighbor's  markets.  Firms'  risk preferences  and  perceptions,  strategic  goals  and
resources will influence their choices of interaction,  from spot market transactions to
strategic  alliances, joint ventures, and integration via mergers and acquisitions.  This
will in turn shape  the  future  mix  of FDI, sales  via  affiliates,  and  trade  among  the
NAFTA partners.
However,  NAFTA  is  only  one  of  many  factors  affecting  commercial  and
investment relationships  and generally not the principal one in the agri-food sector.
Market  and  industry  changes  have  encouraged  the  evolution  of  inter-firm
relationships  away  from  simple  product  exchanges,  toward  strategic  alliances
focused  on coordinating  and  delivering  a bundle of assets,  including new product
development,  year-round  supply,  quality/food  safety  assurance  and  risk sharing.
These require much greater exchange of embedded information and technology.
Evidence  from  the  internationally  focused  alliances  in  Canada/Mexico/
United  States  presented in this paper  highlights issues  that must be  addressed  by
firms who participate in strategic alliances. The strategic alliance life cycle framework
provides a conceptual basis for examining those issues. Alliances vary depending on
the strategies, capabilities  and objectives  of participants,  but to persevere they must
continue  to  offer  value  to  all  partners.  When  the  fundamental  motivators  for  an
alliance  disappear,  alliance  dissolution  usually follows  shortly thereafter,  typically
with one of the partners acquiring the venture.
Although  managers  frequently  spend  a  great  deal  of  time  and  effort
determining  why  they  need to enter  into  alliances  and  with whom,  their  analysis
typically  ends  with  alliance  creation.  The  strategic  alliance  life  cycle  approach92  Policy Harmonization
recommends  that organizations  consider more  than simply those factors  leading to
alliance formation. Examining the issues and factors affecting  all stages of a strategic
alliance's life will enhance the understanding of the alliance process and improve the
likelihood of increasing both the longevity and the value of alliances to organizations.
This analysis will assist organizations in developing plans for navigating  all alliance
stages.  While the rapid rate of change in global business in general, and the agri-food
sector in particular, is encouraging greater use of alliances, the changing environment
also means  that  the conditions  supporting alliances  are  also likely to change  more
quickly.  In the future, firms will move through alliance life cycle stages more rapidly
than  they have in the  past.  Planning for that progression from  the onset is vital  to
maximizing alliance benefits and value.
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